Afghanistan

About this book

The coalition strategy has reached an impasse. None of the efforts attempted since the summer of 2009 has halted the deterioration of the political and security situation. Although a few tactical successes might be possible, the coalition cannot defeat the Taliban or rally local commanders to its side. Moreover, the Karzai government enjoys very limited legitimacy and appears incapable of rebuilding a state that can assume responsibility for its own security in the foreseeable future. The coalition faces the risk of an endless engagement accompanied by an intolerable loss of life and treasure. A less costly solution would be to negotiate a broad agreement with the Taliban leadership to form a national unity government, with guarantees against radical groups returning to Afghanistan. The United States must make contact with the Taliban leadership with the help of Pakistan in order to define the preconditions for negotiations and a ceasefire. The opening of negotiations hardly guarantees results, but the gains are potentially important for the coalition; the losses in the event of failure are negligible, given the absence of feasible alternatives.