The luck preference

About this book

Scholars from philosophy and law have asked how people ought to evaluate those who experience unintended events, be they lucky or unlucky. The general sense is that the experience of sheer luck or ill-luck is and ought to be orthogonal to evaluations of person's worth, being as they are, unintended by the actor. In contrast, across 5 parts involving 16 experiments, I found consistent evidence of a preference for the lucky over the unlucky in children and adults. In Part I, elementary-aged children showed the luck preference (LP) by indicating greater liking of the lucky compared to the unlucky. They corroborated this result by also indicating that the lucky were more likely to engage in intentional good actions than the unlucky. The latter finding was empirically dissociated from a related concept, Piaget's notion of immanent justice. In Part II, I showed that children generalize the LP to those associated with lucky individuals such as siblings and group members. To test the universality of this result, in Part III I examined the LP in Japanese and Mexican children, finding the LP in both samples. In Part IV I investigated the developmental trajectory of the LP. In several studies children as young as 3 years of age endorsed the LP, indicating that this preference cannot be explained by Lerner's developmental just-world thesis (expected to arise later in development). Further experiments confirmed the presence of the LP in adults, even when no threat to participants' sense of justice existed, further limiting a just-world belief interpretation. Finally, in Part V the possibility that a basic affective association between an event's valence and the target of that event may underlie the LP was examined. Younger and older adult participants demonstrated the LP even after they had lost explicit memory for whether a given target had been lucky or unlucky, suggesting that these targets were automatically, evaluatively, "tagged." Finally, the role of the LP in the formation and maintenance of the status quo and prejudice toward the disadvantaged is discussed.