Contractual design with correlated information under limited liabilityDominique M. Demougin · First published 1991Open the Tome
Efficient budget balancing cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoringDominique M. Demougin · First published 1991Open the Tome
Limited liability and an economic measure of information efficiencyDominique M. Demougin · First published 1990Open the Tome
Real effects of money with incomplete but almost costless informationDominique M. Demougin · First published 1990Open the Tome
An ex-post efficient mechanism for a principle-agent model with asymetric informationDominique M. Demougin · First published 1989Open the Tome
Costless revelation of private information in a duopolyDominique M. Demougin · First published 1989Open the Tome
